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1. Introduction 
Although women comprise about 45 percent of the labor force across OECD countries, they 
continue to earn significantly less than men on average and remain dramatically under-
represented among business leaders.1 The OECD average gender wage gap (defined as the 
difference between median male and female wages, divided by the median male wage) among 
full-time workers was 15 percent. While 7.7 percent of employed men in OECD countries had 
managerial responsibilities, only 4.4 percent of employed women did. The highest levels of 
business leadership are even more male dominated. In June 2014, women held only 4.8 percent 
of CEO positions in Fortune 500 companies and 5.0 percent of those positions in Fortune 1000 
companies.2 The gender gap in leadership is even present in Nordic countries. Only 3 percent of 
CEOs at the 145 largest companies in the Nordic countries are female (Zander, 2014). Across all 
public limited companies in Norway, women are 6.4 percent of general managers (Statistics 
Norway, 2014). 
In this paper, we study white-collar private sector workers in Norway to examine a 
potential mechanism that generates these gender gaps in pay and leadership: gender differences 
in career progression. We use comprehensive data on a sample of over half a million worker-year 
observations across over 4,000 work establishments for the time period 1987-1997 and measure 
career advancement using promotions to higher organizational ranks. We first quantify gender 
differences in promotion rates, controlling for a range of factors that might explain women’s 
slower progress up the ranks of corporate hierarchies, including gender differences in education, 
experience, and tenure, as well as selection into workplaces and childcare obligations. We next 
                                                
1 OECD Statistics are from the Online OECD Employment Database, accessed at <http://stats.oecd.org/> 
on June 12, 2014.  
2 See Catalyst at <http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-ceos-fortune-1000> for the full list of 
female CEOs in these groups; accessed June 20, 2014. 
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examine the role of path dependence from previous male dominance of workplaces. We assess 
its importance by measuring the spillover effects of increasing female representation on gender 
differences in promotion rates.  
This analysis is possible because we exploit an unusual dataset on white-collar workers at 
private sector establishments that has several advantages. These advantages enable us to advance 
the literature on gender gaps in promotions and reconcile some of the previous conflicting 
findings.3 First, our data contain detailed job information that enables us to assign workers to one 
of seven hierarchical ranks that are defined consistently across establishments and over time. 
Hence, our sample includes a wide range of employers, unlike many studies of gender gaps in 
promotions that focus on a single firm (Yap and Konrad, 2009; Ransom and Oaxaca, 2005; 
Giuliano et al., 2005; Petersen and Saporta, 2004; Jones and Makepeace, 1996; Hersch and 
Viscusi, 1996; Gerhart and Milkovich, 1989).  
Second, for each employer in our sample, we observe the population of workers. We are 
also able to track workers over time and across establishments in the sample. These features are 
not typically available in samples based on household or firm surveys that include multiple 
firms,4 and they allow us to control for unobservable differences in promotion rates between 
                                                
3 Although most studies find gender gaps that favor men, there are several examples of studies that find 
higher promotion rates for women in the public sector, such as Barnett et al. (2000) on public sector 
workers in California, Hersch and Viscusi (1996) on workers at a public utility, and Powell and 
Butterfield (1994) on promotions to senior executive positions in the federal government. Gerhart and 
Milkovich (1989) finds higher promotion rates for women between 1980 and 1986 in a sample of lower-
level workers (who remained at the company for both years) at a single private company. That company 
was operating under an affirmative action plan at the time, though the plan did not directly apply to the 
sample. Booth et al. (2003) find similar promotion rates between men and women after controlling for 
observable factors, but find that women receive lower wage increases from promotions. 
4 Olson and Becker’s (1983) sample consists of two waves of a survey of workers; Blau and DeVaro 
(2007)’s sample has information on the most recent hires at a cross-section of firms; and Winter-Ebmer 
and Zweimuller (1997) study white-collar workers from a 1% cross-sectional sample of the Austrian 
population, defining past promotions implicitly using current rank and education. 
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workplaces and for the worker’s current rank using a wide range of fixed effects. Data on 
coworkers is what enables our analysis of gender spillovers. 
We also have detailed information on worker characteristics beyond gender, including 
age, experience, occupation, tenure at the firm, tenure in the current rank, occupation, part-time 
status, and children that we can use to examine the role of sex differences in observable 
characteristics in explaining any gender differences in promotions. Although these controls are 
valuable in accounting for differences in preferences or abilities that affect human capital 
investments, it is worth noting we are not able to isolate demand-side explanations entirely. This 
is because differences in experience, occupation and tenure are all equilibrium outcomes that can 
be affected by labor demand and opportunities. Also, although finding a persistent gap with these 
controls can rule out some of the major supply-side explanations for gender differences, it is still 
possible that unmeasured supply factors, reflecting productivity or preferences, contribute to the 
remaining “unexplained” gender gap in promotion rates. 
The fourth advantage of our data is that it includes individuals who change workplaces; 
we can track those changes and define promotion outcomes for those workers as well. This 
allows us to separately study “internal promotions” that depend upon continued employment at 
the same establishment and “any promotions” that also include promotions involving a change of 
employer. This distinction may be important, for example, if men are more likely to change jobs 
if they are not promoted quickly and women are more likely to wait for internal promotions 
(possibly because they are less geographically mobile).  
The main weakness of our data source relative to sources used in some previous studies 
(such as Blau and DeVaro, 2007, and several of the single-firm analyses) is that we do not 
observe performance reviews or evaluations for workers. Although it is possible that these (often 
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subjective) evaluations themselves reflect (possibly unconscious) gender bias on the part of 
evaluators,5 having this information would enable us to distinguish between promotion gaps 
driven by differences in evaluation scores and those caused by women needing to meet higher 
performance benchmarks to advance. This latter situation can arise when the positive signal from 
a high evaluation is perceived as less precise when applied to women: risk averse supervisors 
may then prefer to promote men over equally qualified women (Aigner and Cain, 1977).6 
Without this information, the gender differences in promotions we measure potentially include 
both of these effects. 
The second limitation of our data is that they cover only part of the economy and our 
results may therefore not extend to workers in small firms, blue-collar jobs or the public sector. 
Although the sample restrictions do somewhat limit the scope of the analysis, they allow us to 
study complete workplace hierarchies in which promotion procedures are more homogenous. 
Our first finding is that women in our sample experience a significantly lower annual 
likelihood of advancing a rank than do their male counterparts. We observe lower promotion 
rates for women in the raw data and in regression models with increasing sets of controls for 
individual characteristics and workplace fixed effects. We also observe a significant promotion 
gap from each of the six lower ranks in our data. The promotion gaps are present when 
                                                
5 Ibarra et al.  (2010) discuss gender bias in evaluations the corporate setting and Goldin and Rouse 
(2000) find evidence of bias against female candidates for orchestral positions. Bagues and Esteve-Volart 
(2010) also find evidence of gender bias, but in their setting, evaluators are harsher on candidates of their 
same sex. Evaluations for promotions into management positions may be further influenced by 
stereotypical associations between masculinity and leadership (Koenig et al., 2011). 
6  These concerns, for example, are reflected in a recent McKinsey & Company report that lists 
“institutional feeling that promoting a woman would be ‘too risky’” as an institutional “mindset” that is a 
barrier to women’s advancement (Barsh and Yee, 2011). Bjerk (2008) also considers the possibility that 
women have fewer chances to signal their skill level before entering the labor market or early in their 
careers. 
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promotion is defined exclusively for advances within the same work establishment and when we 
study more general advances that also include moves to new work establishments.  
In the second part of our analysis, we study gender spillovers in promotion rates by 
measuring how the female share of the workforce at the same establishment affects the gender 
gap in promotion. This allows us to focus on workplace, rather than individual, factors that may 
be related to the demand for female leaders. Rather than focusing exclusively on how the 
highest-ranking women (managers, top executives or board members) affect lower ranking 
workers,  our study considers the entire organizational hierarchy of white collar workers and 
considers changes in the female share7 of two groups of coworkers: “peers” at the same rank and 
“bosses” at a higher rank.  
Our empirical analysis finds significant gender spillover effects from both bosses and 
peers, but in opposite directions. We find that higher female shares among bosses in the next 
highest rank are related to increased promotion rates for women relative to men, but that higher 
female shares among same-ranked coworkers are related to lower rates. These results are 
consistent across a range of models with different sets of control variables and are robust to 
alternative definitions of female leadership shares.  
Previous studies have measured gender spillovers in hierarchical organizations, but this 
paper is the first to measure effects of both types of coworkers on promotion rates using private 
sector data. The only other study we are aware of that also measures effects of demographic 
interactions from both peers and superiors on promotion rates is Karaca-Mandic et al.’s (2013) 
                                                
7 This feature allows us to study large amount of variation in female leadership across ranks and 
establishments and over time. We also study Norway in the period before the gender quotas for corporate 
boards. Using more recent data around the time of the quota’s proposal and adoption, Bertrand et al. 
(2014) find limited gender spillover effects of the quota on top managers and no statistically significant 
gender spillovers on the overall workforce. Their study also considers spillovers on the overall population 
of Norway, in which over 30 percent of working women are in the public sector. Our sample consists of 
white-collar workers in the private sector and is approximately 30 percent female.    
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study of racial and gender spillovers among the lowest-ranking enlisted members of the US 
Army. Although that setting is quite different from the white-collar workforce in Norway, it is 
interesting that the pattern of gender spillovers observed in that study is the same: positive 
effects of female superiors but negative effects of female peers.8  
Papers that have focused exclusively on “downward” flowing gender spillovers on 
promotion rates at lower ranks tend not to find significant effects. Blau and DeVaro (2007) use 
cross-sectional survey data on recent hires in U.S. firms. They find female workers have lower 
promotion rates and the sex of the worker’s immediate supervisor does not interact significantly 
with the worker’s own sex in affecting promotion probability. Giuliano et al. (2005) also find no 
differential effects of supervisor sex on promotion rates for female employees (though they do 
find a slight reduction in quit rates); they argue this may be because their sample is “relatively 
youthful and predominantly female” (p. 3). Using data on Danish companies, Smith et al. (2013) 
find lower rates of promotion from Vice President to CEO positions for women (including both 
internal and external hires); female leadership at the hiring company does not mediate this effect.  
In contrast with those studies, we use panel data on workers across all ranks and include a 
range of controls for detailed worker and establishment characteristics and fixed effects. Most 
importantly, we control for the worker’s current rank (promotion rates vary by rank) and for the 
female share among peers. This last variable is correlated with female leadership, but has a 
negative effect on female promotion rates, so its omission can be a major source of downward 
bias in the estimated effect of female bosses.   
Our finding of positive spillovers from female leaders is more in line with the results 
from studies that examine the representation of women at lower ranks in their organizations 
                                                
8 Ciliberto et al.’s (2013) study of peer effects in fertility decisions also finds evidence of heterogeneous 
effects, with negative spillovers dominating within some types and positive spillovers across types. 
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rather than promotion rates (e.g., Cohen et al.’s (1998) analysis of 333 savings and loan banks in 
California, Kurtulus and Tomaskovic-Devey’s (2012) study of the more comprehensive data on 
the demographic composition of workforces reported by private sector employers). Matsa and 
Miller (2011) and Bell (2005) find evidence of women helping women at the highest levels of 
major US corporations: increases in female board representation are followed in later years by 
greater female representation at the CEO and top executive level and smaller gender pay gaps 
among top executives. However, because the spillover effects found in these papers are not based 
on longitudinal data on individual workers, they may be coming from either increases in 
promotion rates or from changes in hiring patterns. Indeed, Cohen et al. (1998) argue that a 
possible source of the spillovers they find is that female leaders are better able to identify and 
recruit talented female workers to work at their companies.  
By studying the effects of female representation across the organizational hierarchy on 
promotion rates, this paper also contributes to a broader literature on the effects of female 
business leaders on lower-ranking workers in their organizations. Recent papers have considered 
compensation levels and gender pay gaps (Flabbi et al., 2014; Tate and Yang, 2013; Cardoso and 
Winter-Ebmer, 2010) as well as employment and downsizing rates (Matsa and Miller 2013, 
2014).   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the 
empirical relevance of gender differences in promotions. Section 3 presents our approach to 
estimating promotion regressions and the results from our examination of gender differences in 
promotion rates. Section 4 presents our approach to measure gender spillovers and results from 
that analysis. Section 5 concludes.  
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2. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
This paper uses longitudinal linked employer-employee data on private sector white-collar 
workers in Norway based on register data from Statistics Norway and data on job types from an 
establishment-level survey compiled by Statistics Norway and the Confederation of Norwegian 
Enterprise (NHO, Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon), the primary employer association in 
Norway. The goal of the data collection was to obtain an overview of earnings among white-
collar workers; response rates among surveyed establishments (with at least 5 such workers) 
were very high because employers were legally bound to collect and report their data. Our 
sample covers the time period 1987 to 1997, which is the longest time period for which all of our 
key variables are available, and includes workers born between 1936 and 1969.9  
Because we rely on the NHO survey, our estimation sample is limited to workers at 
private-sector firms that are NHO members and over-represents manufacturing. See Table 1A in 
the Appendix for the distribution of workers across industry groups in our sample of 
establishments and in the full working population of Norway in 1997. Establishments in the 
NHO sample also tend to be larger and older than average and their employees tend to be more 
educated and to earn higher wages. Nevertheless, the sample has broad coverage. In 1997, NHO 
employees represented 37 percent of all male workers and 27 percent of all female workers in 
Norway (Appendix Table 1A).  
We also restrict our data to white-collar workers to ensure a relatively comparable set of 
jobs with substantial presence of both male and female workers. Women comprise 28 percent of 
our sample that includes all ranks and 30 percent of the sample of workers below the top rank, 
                                                
9 Before 1987, only limited register information is available from Statistics Norway. After 1997, the NHO 
ceased collecting the data. For more details, see the yearly publication Lønnsstatistikk for funksjonærer. 
The birth cohorts 1936 to 1969 are those who can potentially be followed during the 10 year observation 
window. 
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who have a chance of promotion. Like any employment-based sample, our sample is limited to 
current workers and excludes people who are unemployed or out of the labor market. Workers on 
temporary leave from a job, such as disability or parental leave, however, are included in the 
data. 
The rest of this section describes the key outcome measures and explanatory variables 
used in the analysis. 
2.1 Data on Promotions 
We define a promotion in our data as a year-to-year increase in a worker’s rank. Workers’ ranks 
are determined using three pieces of information drawn directly from NHO survey responses 
completed by a responsible person within each establishment for each worker: their occupational 
group, their task level within that occupational group, and the corresponding job description for 
that occupational group and task level combination. The occupational group, task levels and job 
description categories were all predefined by the NHO and provided to establishment officials in 
the form of a grid on the survey into which they sorted each of their white-collar employees, with 
very limited exceptions (such as journalists and the CEO).  
Our rank assignments are mainly based on each worker’s job’s task level within its 
occupational group. The occupational groups are: (A) technical; (B) production supervision; (C) 
administrative, including clerical, accounting, and shipping; (D) sales; (E) storage; and (F) other. 
Within each occupational group, up to seven task levels are distinguished, ranging from 
unskilled and routine tasks in the lower levels to high-skill and leadership tasks in the higher 
levels. Not all occupations span all task levels; some are concentrated in the lower levels while 
others are in the higher levels.  
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Because the task levels are designed for comparisons within occupational groups, we also 
use information the detailed job descriptions to assign ranks in a way that ensures comparability 
across occupational groups. For example, as shown in Appendix Table 2A (which contains 
sample job titles and occupations within each level), task level 6 in occupation group A (job type 
A6) and task level 4 in occupation group C (C4) are both in the lowest hierarchical rank. The 
reason is that the job descriptions of A6 and C4 are both limited to jobs with routine tasks (A6 
requires completing routine tasks and following instructions, while C4 requires completing 
simple routine tasks). Although there is some discretion involved in comparing task levels across 
occupations based on the job descriptions, the ranking within occupations is completed as part of 
the survey response.  
We define a promotion in year t as job change between year t and year t+1 that entails an 
increase in rank. An internal promotion is defined as a promotion in which the worker remains at 
the same establishment in period t+1; overall promotions are counted irrespective of whether the 
worker changes establishment. Our definition of internal promotions more closely matches the 
definition of promotions used by other authors in the literature (e.g., Booth et al. 2003). As in 
that literature, the outcome of changing jobs (with or without an increase in rank) is counted as 
not being promoted internally. The advantage of our measure of overall promotions is that it also 
captures the possibility of career progression up the job ladder when changing establishments. 
We are uniquely able to measure this progression because our 7-rank scale for hierarchies is 
consistent across establishments and time.  
Because not all establishments have positions in all seven ranks and many workers stay at 
their same establishment from one year to the next, a promotion across multiple ranks may have 
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different meanings in different establishments.10 We therefore focus on binary measures of 
progress instead of comparing the size of the rank change. Because these ranks are defined 
consistently across all establishments in the sample and over time, we are able to track career 
progress for individuals who change jobs within the sample.  
Table 1 summarizes the distribution of workers across ranks in the entire sample, overall 
and separately by sex. Figure 1 plots the female share of workers in each rank. Women are vastly 
over-represented in the lowest rank, which is over 80 percent female. The next two ranks are 
closer to representative (women comprise 25 percent of rank 2 and 36 percent of rank 3; both 
comparable to their overall share of 28 percent of the sample). Rank 4 has even lower female 
presence (17 percent), and men dominate the three highest ranks, comprising over 90 percent of 
each. We also report a summary of different plant-year level measures of female representation 
in Appendix Table 3A. Across all years in our data, women are never more than 6 percent of the 
top three ranks, on average, even as their overall share of the average workplace increases from 
25 to 33 percent.  
Table 1 also reports mean values of our annual promotion rates in the main analysis 
sample (7.1 percent) and separately for men (7.3 percent) and women (6.6 percent). The vast 
majority of men and women (87 percent) stay in the same rank from year to year. But promotion 
rates vary dramatically across ranks, as shown in Table 2, dropping from 13 to 1.7 percent from 
ranks 1 to 6. This means that the overall gender difference in Table 1 understates the difference 
in promotion opportunities for similarly situated men and women. This variation is illustrated 
                                                
10 For example, rank 5 is far less commonly observed than rank 4 or 6. Smaller establishments that offer 
no jobs at this rank will have a “standard” promotion of two ranks for workers going from rank 4. In 
general, workers at establishments with deeper hierarchies will have more promotion opportunities for 
internal promotion. In addition to defining promotions as binary rank increases, we also address this issue 
in our analysis by including promotions that involve job changes in our outcome variable and by 
controlling for establishment fixed effects.  
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graphically in Figure 1, which plots the ratio of female to male promotion rates separately by 
rank. With the exception of the small fifth rank, this ratio is always substantially less than 1, 
ranging from 0.53 to 0.69.11  
The raw gender gap in internal promotions in Table 1 is substantially smaller than the gap 
for any promotions, suggesting that differential mobility may be part of the promotion gap, but 
the sex ratios for internal promotion rates in Figure 1 fall into a similar range from 0.56 to 0.71 
for ranks other than 5. The average shares of men and women staying at the same work 
establishment (conditional on remaining in the sample) are identical at 74 percent across all 
ranks (Table 1), though the shares staying tend to be somewhat higher for men, conditional on 
rank, and a large gap emerges at the highest rank (Table 2 and Figure 1).12 Women’s greater 
likelihood of leaving their firm (or, as discussed in Section 2.3, of departing the sample entirely) 
from this most elevated rank leads to even lower rates of female representation in leadership than 
would be predicted from gender differences in promotions alone. 
2.2 Explanatory Variables 
The summary statistics in Table 2 demonstrate the importance of controlling for starting rank in 
attempting to measure gender differences in promotion opportunities. But starting rank is not the 
only observable dimension over which men and women in our sample differ. The summary 
statistics in Table 1 show gender differences in age, formal schooling, work experience, tenure at 
the current workplace, rank-specific tenure (time since initial entry or since the last promotion, 
whichever is more recent), with men having a higher average value for each of these variables. 
                                                
11 The pattern of lower rates of promotion for higher ranks is a typical feature of workplace hierarchies. 
Other evidence that our rank measure is capturing meaningful variation in job status is the increasing 
hourly wages at ascending ranks (Table 2) and (unreported) large year-on-year wage growth concurrent 
with promotions. Mean age and years of education also increase as rank increases (Table 4A). 
12 Note that workers may also go down in rank, which is why the probabilities of promotions and no 
change of rank do not add to 100 percent. 
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We also define a part-time status variable as having usual weekly work hours of less than 37 
over the year. This variable is defined based on contracted hours, which means that leave taking 
does not reduce workers’ average weekly hours. Nevertheless, women are significantly more 
likely to be working part-time (26 percent do so) than men (only 7.8 percent) in our sample.  
Each of these variables may be related to worker productivity and may therefore affect 
promotion rates, so we use them as controls in our empirical analyses. Because we are concerned 
that the variables related to recent labor supply decisions such as experience, tenure and part-
time status may themselves be endogenous, and affected by expectations about promotion 
opportunities, we also present baseline models that exclude these variables. We include all of 
these controls in our main specification to provide a stronger test for how much of the gender 
gap in promotions is “unexplained” by observable work-related differences. We also estimate 
expanded versions of the model in Section 3 that add controls for family status. Specifically, we 
use birth register data to create indicator variables for whether or not the worker has any children 
under the age of 17 and under the age of 7.  
In Section 4, we analyze how the female share at a workplace affects its promotion rates 
by adding explanatory variables that measure coworker demographics. The first is the female 
share among peers, where peers are defined here as workers at the same rank, work 
establishment and year. This variable has a mean of 30 percent for all workers, with a mean of 18 
percent for men and 58 percent for women (Table 1), consistent with some sex segregation 
across workplaces and ranks. The second coworker variable is the female share among “bosses” 
working at the next highest rank at the same work establishment and year.13 This variable has a 
lower mean of 17 percent, reflecting women’s under-representation at higher ranks. The gender 
                                                
13 Note that in the regressions we include the female share among bosses measured in period t. The 
promotion outcomes are measured between t and t+1. 
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gap in this variable is smaller than for the peer variable; the mean values are 14 percent for men 
and 25 percent for women (Table 1). Across all observations in our sample, over 25 percent of 
workers have zero female bosses and only 1 percent of workers have all female bosses.  
Two features of our measure of female bosses are worth noting. First, the measure is 
based only on establishment level rates; we are not able to identify workers’ immediate 
supervisors (as in Karaca-Mandic et al., 2013, and in Blau and DeVaro, 2007). If the effects of 
female bosses run exclusively within the chain of authority, then our estimates, based on a noisy 
measure, will tend to understate the importance of female bosses. To the extent that promotion 
decisions involve multiple decision-makers and that mentoring and role model effects occur 
outside of the immediate chain of command, our approach will capture meaningful spillover 
effects. Second, our main measure of female bosses is rank-specific, and focuses on female 
representation at the next higher rank. This approach has the advantage of measuring effects of 
female leadership deeper within organizational hierarchies. In our robustness analysis of Section 
4.3, we also explore the possibility that female shares two ranks higher or among the 
establishment’s top leadership, defined based on rank, earnings or leadership job tasks, affect 
gender gaps in promotion rates. 
2.3 Empirical Relevance of Gender Gaps in Promotion 
Before turning to the econometric analysis, this section examines the empirical relevance of 
gender differences in promotions in affecting two other gender gaps of interest: the gender gap in 
business leadership and the gap in pay. The first step of this examination is to quantify the 
contribution of sex differences in promotion rates into the outcome of sex differences in the 
distribution of workers across the hierarchical ranks. The second step is to show that these 
 15 
gendered distributions across ranks contribute substantially to gender pay differences in our 
sample.  
 In quantifying the role of promotions in gendered rank distributions, we use a simple 
framework to relate the three major factors that contribute to unequal distributions of workers 
across ranks by sex. The simple framework relates the distribution of workers across ranks in 
period t (the vector vt) to the basic inputs: the transition rates between ranks (M; where element 
Mij is the year-to-year probability of going to rank i from rank j), the exit flow from each rank 
(e), and the flow of new entrants into the ranks (u). The exit flows can be used to construct a 
matrix R that reflects that probability of staying in the sample into the next period, conditional on 
current rank. The matrix R has zeros in the off-diagonal elements, and values of (1-ei) for the 
diagonal elements Rii.  
The input flows can be combined with the current period’s rank distribution to generate 
next period’s rank distribution according to this equation: 
 (1) vt+1  = (R M) vt + u       
Assuming that the three inputs are stable over time, the steady state distribution of workers 
across ranks will be: 
(2) v∞  = (1 – R M)-1 u        
In this exercise, we use data from our sample on each of the inputs to predict the steady state 
distribution of workers across ranks. We can then examine the potential importance of each input 
– promotion rates, entry ranks, and rank-specific exit rates – by using the model to predict how 
eliminating gender differences in that input affects the steady state distribution of men and 
women across ranks. 
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There are various reasons why this model will not apply exactly on our sample: 1) the 
inputs are not stable over time, as female labor force participation is increasing over the period; 
and, therefore, 2) our data may not reflect a steady state. Also, we introduce noise in this exercise 
by not using the full transition matrix observed in our data but instead focusing on promotions 
alone and treating all promotions as increases of a single rank. Indeed, the steady state model 
(using average entry, exit and promotion rates for men and women observed over the entire 
period) predicts higher levels of female leadership than those in our data. The share of female 
workers in the top three ranks is 6.3 percent in the sample; the steady state predicted value is 
14.4 percent, which suggests that our time period is one of transition toward greater gender 
equality (consistent with trends in Appendix Table 3A). Similarly, the ratio of the female share 
in the top three ranks to the female share in the bottom three ranks is 0.16 in the data while the 
predicted steady state ratio is 0.33.  
 Varying each of the inputs in turn to equalize promotion, entry and exit rates between the 
sexes produces higher steady state predictions for female leadership shares. The female share in 
the top three ranks increases a similar amount under each change, going to 20 percent under 
equal promotion rates for men and women, to 21 percent under equal entry ranks, and to 18 
percent under equal rank-specific exit rates. These changes also increase the predicted ratio of 
female shares in top and bottom ranks, but the effects differ by input. Equalizing entry ranks has 
the largest effect, driving the ratio to 0.67. Equalizing promotions increases the ratio to 0.48, but 
equalizing exits increases it to only 0.39 (this is because the change also lowers the chance that 
women in lower ranks exit the sample).  
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Although these values are unlikely to be accurate predictions of the exact impact of 
reducing the gender gap in promotions, they do support the quantitative importance of gender 
gaps in promotions in generating the observed gender gaps in leadership. 
 The second step of this examination is to measure the importance of gendered rank 
distributions in producing gender gaps in pay. This step fits with previous evidence that much of 
the gender pay gap is driven by women and men working in different jobs (e.g., Lazear and 
Rosen, 1990). For this step, we construct an hourly wage variable by taking the ratio of monthly 
earnings to normal hours of work.14 Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics for this variable, 
overall and by sex. The summary statistics in Table 2 (and the wage ratio curve in Figure 1) 
show initial evidence that rank is an important factor in predicting wages and creating gender 
wage gaps. The ratio of female average pay to male average pay across all ranks is 0.76. The 
ratios within each rank are closer to equality, ranging from 0.88 to 0.98. 
We formalize this step by regressing the natural log of hourly pay on a Female indictor 
variable and four sets of control variables (described in Section 2.2) to measure the 
“unexplained” gender pay gap. For each set of controls, we estimate versions of the model with 
and without fixed effects for our 7 hierarchical ranks. The results of these regressions, reported 
in Figure 2, show that ranks play a substantial role in producing gender pay gaps. In the first 
column, with no other controls, the raw gap decreases by 59 percent (from 0.27 to 0.11) with the 
inclusion of rank effects. This pattern is repeated across the other models, in which the gender 
pay gaps are reduced by 55 to 57 percent with the rank controls.  
                                                
14 The variable for normal work hours is a based on contracted hours and excludes overtime hours. 
Earnings are from work and benefit claims that exclude overtime payments. Together, these allow us to 
measure hourly earnings from regular work. 
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The results in this section provide empirical support for the relevance of our primary 
outcome of interest. In particular, studying gender differences in promotion rates can help 
researchers learn about a key mechanism that generates gender differences in leadership and pay. 
3. Gender Differences in Promotion Rates  
This section presents our empirical analysis of sex differences in promotions up the hierarchical 
ranks of the workplaces in our sample. As discussed in Francesconi (2001) and elsewhere, there 
are several theories of promotions. Internal promotion schemes can be viewed as a way to reward 
performance and thereby induce effort among lower-ranking workers. Internal promotions can 
also reflect workers accumulating human capital (some of it firm-specific) in lower tasks that 
increases their productivity at higher tasks or firms learning over time about the quality of their 
matches with individual workers. External promotions are more like hiring decisions and initial 
task assignments, but outside offers can also be affected by wages and promotion chances at the 
current employer. 
Because, as discussed in the previous sections, men and women differ in many 
observable characteristics that may affect promotion rates under the various theories, we estimate 
regression models of promotion outcomes using various sets of controls and fixed effects and 
focus on measuring the unexplained or residual systematic variation in promotion rates related to 
gender.   
 Although some of this residual variation may be attributable to discrimination on the part 
of employers or higher ranking coworkers (based on discriminatory tastes, as in Arrow, 1973, or 
statistical beliefs about future commitment to the workplace as in Lazear and Rosen, 1990), our 
approach is not able to rule out supply-side differences in preferences and behavior between 
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male and female workers.15 In fact, the notion of a sharp distinction between supply-side and 
demand-side explanations for gender differences may be misleading because it ignores the 
interactions between the two sides of the market. For example, if women tend to specialize in 
childcare and home production and invest less in their careers than men, profit-maximizing 
employers may react by offering them fewer employment and advancement opportunities and 
lower salaries. At the same time, if women face worse labor market opportunities than men, on 
average, that can justify and perpetuate a division of labor within households that has women 
specializing in home production. It is also worth noting that the extent to which fertility and 
household responsibilities affect workplace productivity also depends in part on the structure of 
jobs and workplaces. 
3.1 Overall Gender Gaps in Promotions 
Our basic estimation equation takes the following form: 
(3) Promotionijt =  βFFemalei + βXXijt + εijt 
The unit of observation is an individual i observed in year t working at establishment j. Where 
Promotionijt is an indicator for that person being observed at higher rank in year t+1 than in year 
t, Femalei is an indicator for the worker being female, Xijt is the set of covariates, and εijt is a 
random error term. We estimate all models using OLS and account for potential correlations in 
promotion rates among peers by clustering standard errors at the level of the plant-rank-year 
group.16 In this first phase of estimation, the Xijt vectors in different models include different sets 
                                                
15 Examples of preference differences include tastes for risk (Eckel and Grossman 2008), competition 
(Niederle and Vesterlund 2007) or valuing money and career over relationships (Fortin 2008). For recent 
surveys, see Bertrand (2010) and Croson and Gneezy (2009). 
16 The marginal effects from Probit models corresponding to the specification in Column (2) of Table 3 
are very similar to the OLS estimates: −0.027 (s.e. of 0.001) for all promotions, −0.020 (s.e. of 0.001) for 
internal promotions, and −0.0002 (s.e. of 0.002) for staying at the plant. In separate estimation, we also 
confirmed that the gender gaps in promotions (all and internal) remain statistically significant at the 1 
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of individual characteristics and fixed effects. Because our outcome variable is defined based on 
changes in rank, this specification has the same spirit as a first-differences specification for rank, 
which accounts for unobservable differences that affect starting rank. One difference is that our 
outcome variable focuses exclusively on rank increases and ignores their magnitude. Another 
difference is that, in our model, the controls for unchanging factors (gender, education) and for 
those that identically increment by one for all of the workers in our sample (age, experience, 
tenure) account for how those factors affect the rate of change of an individual’s rank rather than 
how they affect its current level. The level effects of these factors are impossible to estimate in a 
first-difference model because the variable for their year-to-year changes would have the same 
value for all observations (zero for the fixed and one for the incrementing factors).  
In the basic version of the model, we control for year, industry, occupation,17 age, 
schooling and rank fixed effects. In this specification, female workers have a 3.5 percentage 
point lower chance of promotion, as reported in Column 1 of the top panel in Table 3. The 
promotion outcome in this panel exploits the fact that we can track workers across 
establishments and includes any promotions, even those that include a workplace transition.  
This 3.5 percentage point gender gap represents a 52 percent reduction relative to the 
average promotion rate for male workers. This is larger than the raw sex difference in promotion 
rates in Table 1, in large part because women are far more likely to be working in the lowest rank 
where promotion rates are highest (Table 2). The importance of controlling for current level may 
explain some of the discrepancies across other studies of sex differences in promotion rates: 
                                                                                                                                                       
percent level when errors are clustered at the plant-year or plant level. These alternative schemes account 
for possible correlations in promotion rates within establishments at a point in time or over time. 
17 We control for occupational group to account for the fact that promotion rates differ depending on 
starting occupational group and men and women are not equally distributed across the groups (see 
Appendix Table 8A). Therefore the gender gaps in promotions are not the result of sex-based 
occupational segregation (Blau et al., 2012).  
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studies without such controls that compare men at higher starting ranks than women may not 
find significant gender differences even if they are present conditional on the same starting rank.  
Across the four models in Table 3, we find consistent statistically and economically 
significant gender differences in promotion rates. Adding quadratic controls for experience and 
tenure, a linear control for rank-specific tenure, and an indicator for part-time status (defined as 
having usual weekly work hours below 37) in Column 2 reduces the Female coefficient to 2.9 
percentage points, a 40 percent reduction from the male rate. Effects of age, schooling and 
civilian work experience are separately identified in our sample because of variation in time out 
of the labor market and time in military service. The full set of estimates for the control 
variables, other than fixed effects, are reported in Appendix Table 5A. The large and significant 
negative effect of part-time status on promotions explains much of the decline in the gender gap 
between Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3. Although it is illegal for employers in Norway to 
discriminate against part-time workers, it appears that their career progress is still slower. 
The next column adds plant-level fixed effects and contains our preferred model. This 
change increases the size of the Female coefficient to −0.033.18 This increase suggests that the 
lower promotion rates for women are not explained by women sorting into workplaces, possibly 
those with family friendly policies, that offer fewer promotion opportunities for all of their 
workers. Instead, it suggests that women tend to work at plants with higher promotion rates. 
Although other studies have found that worker sorting, and workplace (establishment or firm) 
fixed effects more generally, are important contributors to the measured gender gaps in career 
                                                
18 Using firm fixed effects instead produces nearly identical results; see Appendix Table 5A, Columns 3 
and 4. This suggests that average promotion rates are similar across establishments at multi-establishment 
firms. 
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outcomes, that does not appear to be the case in our current setting. 19 Conditional on our main 
individual and establishment characteristics, which include occupational group, the gender gap in 
promotion rates is unaffected by plant fixed effects. The gender pay gap in our sample, measured 
in hourly earnings, is similarly unaffected by plant fixed effects (see Figure 2).  
Finally, in the fourth column, we add controls for family status using two indicator 
variables: one for having any children under the age of 17 and another for any children under the 
age of 7. We also interact these variables with the Female indicator to allow children to have 
different effects on career progress for men and women. For men, fatherhood is associated with a 
greater chance of promotion, and there is no significant difference in the effects of younger 
children (estimates are in Column 5 of Appendix Table 5A). For women, children have a 
negative effect on promotion rates and that effect is even more negative if they are younger. This 
result is consistent with studies of wage growth that find flattening of wage profiles after 
motherhood (e.g., Miller, 2011; Ejrnæs and Kunze, 2013).20 The Female coefficient in Column 4 
of Table 3 should be interpreted as the gender difference in promotions for workers with no 
children. It is smaller than the overall estimate of −0.033 in the previous column, but still 
economically and statistically significant (−0.025).  
In addition to these main specifications, we also estimated an exploratory model with an 
additional indicator for earning a high wage (in the top 30 percent) for one’s rank, establishment 
                                                
19 A recent example is Card et al. (2014), who find that firm effects, which they decompose into sorting 
and bargaining components, account for about 21 percent of the gender pay gap (4.9 percent out of 23.4 
percent) in their data from Portugal.  
20 In a separate regression model, we also account for changes in Norwegian parental leave policy that 
extended the total leave period (from 165 to 294 days at 100 percent salary replacement, or from 210 to 
364 days at 80 percent, subject to a salary cap) and that introduced paternity leave (reserving 4 weeks to 
the father). In the regression we add interaction terms between a Post-1992 indictor (after the policy 
change) and the two indicators for having young children. These interactions are statistically significant 
(and the policy is associated with a small decline in promotions for fathers of young children and an 
increase in promotions for mothers of young children), but they leave the other coefficient estimates 
unchanged. 
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and year. This variable is meant to proxy for the productivity of the worker relative to other 
contenders for promotion;21 it is a strong predictor of promotion within the next year (coefficient 
of 0.074, Column 7 of Appendix Table 5A). The mean value of this variable is substantially 
higher for men than for women (Table 1), which suggests that it might explain part of the gender 
gap in promotions. Indeed, including the variable reduces the Female coefficient somewhat (to 
−0.023), but it remains highly significant. We omit this variable from our preferred models, 
however, because it combines true productivity with evaluation and compensation decisions by 
employers that may themselves contain gender biases. Including it as a control therefore runs the 
risk of over-controlling for differences in how men and women are treated in the workplace. 
In the second panel of Table 3, we repeat the analysis for promotion outcomes within the 
same establishment. Individuals who leave the establishment are assigned a zero value for this 
variable, so the sample size is unchanged between the two panels of the table. For internal 
promotions, we again find negative and significant Female coefficients across the different 
specifications, though the magnitudes are smaller, ranging from −0.028 to −0.020. These values 
represent 34 to 47 percent lower internal promotion rates for women relative to the mean rate for 
men of 0.058 (Table 1). The estimates are similar for the two measures of promotions, but the 
higher estimates for the main measure suggests that part of the gender gap is from men being 
more likely to change workplaces in order to obtain a promotion. The complete regression results 
are reported in Table 6A. 
Given the larger gender difference in overall promotions compared to internal 
promotions, it is natural to ask if gender differences in mobility rates contribute to the overall 
promotion differences. We therefore explored overall sex differences in turnover rates in the 
                                                
21 Because our rank levels are broad enough to include multiple job titles and sub-ranks, high wages 
might also indicate having achieved a higher sub-rank within the rank. 
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bottom panel of Table 3 using the same sample as the previous panels. The outcome variable is 
an indicator for staying at the same plant in the next year. We find no significant gender 
differences in this outcome across the specifications in Table 3.22  
The lack of overall sex differences in workplace transitions within the sample, together 
with the finding of sex differences in internal promotion rates, suggests that the promotion gap is 
not caused by overall differences in job mobility rates. However, these results do not entirely 
preclude a role for differential mobility in generating gender gaps in promotions. First, our 
sample is limited to individuals who are in our sample of private sector workers in two adjacent 
years, so we ignore differences in exit rates from the population of interest. Second, average 
transition rates may be the same for men and women, but the reasons for job changes may still 
differ systematically (for example, if men leave for better pay and higher status and women leave 
for greater workplace flexibility). Finally, if men who receive competing job offers are more 
likely to receive attractive counter-offers from their current employers, the sexes could end up 
with similar job change rates as men become more likely to be promoted internally. 
3.2 Gender Gaps in Promotions by Rank 
A key question about the average differences in promotion rates is if the differences are present 
across all ranks or if they are mainly concentrated at the lowest ranks, corresponding to a “sticky 
floor” story, or at the highest ranks, because of a “glass ceiling” beyond which promotions 
become more difficult or impossible for women.23 Different papers have found evidence of 
gender gaps in promotion at different points in organizational hierarchies: Smith et al. (2013), 
                                                
22 This also holds for the additional specifications shown in Appendix Table 7A, with one exception. In 
the model with firm fixed effects in Column 3, the Female coefficient is positive and significant. This 
difference is not robust to including plant fixed effects. 
23 Bjerk (2008) and Yap and Konrad (2009) discuss the different career stages at which gender differences 
may emerge. In addition to the “glass ceiling” and “sticky floor”, there can also be a “mid-level 
bottleneck). This concept of a sticky floor differs somewhat from that in Booth et al. (2003), which 
instead relates to wages within ranks. 
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find gaps at the highest level for promotions from Vice President (VP) to CEO but not for 
promotions to VP, and single-firm studies such as Yap and Konrad (2009), Jones and Makepeace 
(1996), and Petersen and Saporta (2004), find gender gaps at the lower and middle ranks. This 
paper is the first multi-firm analysis that measures promotion gaps separately at all hierarchical 
levels.  
The results in Table 4 are from an expanded version of the promotion Equation 3 that 
includes a full set of interaction terms between Female and the 6 rank indicators (for each of the 
ranks from which promotion is possible). We report estimates from our preferred specification in 
the previous table (Table 3, Column 3) with controls for industry, occupation, rank, year, age, 
schooling, experience, tenure, rank specific tenure and part-time status, as well as establishment 
fixed effects. Across all starting ranks, we find that women are less likely than men to be 
promoted to a higher rank by the next year. This is true for either measure of promotions 
(Columns 1 and 2). The outcome in the final column is staying at the same plant. There are no 
significant gender differences in the lower ranks, but a significant (at the 10 percent level) 
positive gap emerges at the sixth rank.  
Our analysis, therefore, reveals that the sex differences in promotion rates at the highest 
ranks found in Smith et al. (2013) and for entry-level workers found in the single-firm studies are 
present across all hierarchical ranks in our sample, and further, that these gaps are not driven by 
differences in establishment-level retention rates.  
4. Gender Spillovers in Promotion Rates  
Having documented substantial and significant gender gaps in promotion rates, the second phase 
of our analysis turns to the question of whether or not the gender mix of coworkers at workplaces 
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affects these gaps. Specifically, we ask if increases in the shares of female bosses and female 
peers affect gender differences in promotion rates.  
The prior literature suggests several reasons why gender spillovers from bosses might be 
positive. Positive spillovers will occur if higher-ranking women serve as mentors, role models, 
and advocates for their lower-ranking coworkers (Athey et al., 2000).24  Spillovers from bosses 
will also be positive if taste-based discrimination (against people of the opposite sex) or 
statistical discrimination (for example, if people are better at evaluating the work performance of 
others who are more similar to them, as in Aigner and Cain, 1977) is important for promotions. 
Increasing female representation at higher ranks may also improve promotion rates for lower-
ranking women by weakening the associations of leadership with masculinity (Koenig et al., 
2011) and providing reassurance to decision-makers that women are capable of performing well 
at higher ranks.25  
Each of the channels above for positive spillovers from female leaders to lower-ranking 
women within a plant may affect internal promotions at that same plant. For workers who change 
plants, our approach focuses on measuring spillovers from the worker’s current female leaders, 
who can provide help within the current plant or at a new location. For promotions that involve a 
change in workplace, we do not study any sorting effects from female leaders hiring more 
                                                
24 An effective mentor can improve a worker’s performance by providing useful information and 
guidance, and can increase their chances of promotion with or without improved performance. Ibarra et 
al. (2010) distinguish between “mentors” and “sponsors”: the former provide advice and emotional 
support and can be at any rank, while the latter are relatively senior and act as advocates.  They suggest 
that one reason that women with mentors report lower promotion rates than men with mentors is that 
women’s mentors tend to be less powerful in their organizations and less likely to act as sponsors.  
25 It is also possible that sexual harassment against female workers is less frequent in settings with more 
female bosses.  
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capable women or hiring women into higher-ranking positions. 26  Finding positive gender 
spillovers from female bosses, under any of these theories, would suggest that men’s historical 
dominance of business leadership can be self-perpetuating in equilibrium, but may potentially be 
disrupted by increasing female shares at higher ranks.  
Although policymakers and advocates for increasing female business leadership often 
assume that gender spillovers from bosses are positive, it is worth noting that this need not be the 
case. The spillovers from female bosses can be negative if the “queen bee” phenomenon is 
common. This happens when a woman who achieves career success in a male-dominated field 
blocks other women from advancing (Staines et al., 1974). Although women are often expected 
to be more favorable judges of other women’s work, 27 there is evidence of the opposite pattern 
in some male-dominated fields, which could also lead to negative spillovers, as in Bagues and 
Esteve-Volart (2010). The authors hypothesize this occurs because female evaluators have a 
“self-enhancement” motive to identify with the male majority.  
Gender spillovers among peers can also be positive or negative. For example, women 
may be more willing to compete with other women (as in Gneezy et al., 2003), which could lead 
to higher overall female performance and higher promotion rates. However, unlike the laboratory 
setting with individual tasks, the workplace often involves both individual and cooperative tasks. 
While it is possible that women collaborate more with other women, it is also possible that 
women feel that their closest competitors for promotion are other women. This could happen, for 
example, in response to tokenism at workplaces or informal limits on the numbers of women in 
                                                
26 This contrasts with other studies of female leadership that relate outcomes for workers to the current 
leaders at their firm (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2014) and with studies that isolate workers who change firms 
and focus on the leaders at the new firm (e.g., Smith et al., 2013; Tate and Yang, 2013). 
27 There is also experimental evidence from cognitive psychology that unconscious biases against women 
in performance ratings are less severe when women comprise a larger share of the team (summarized in 
Valian, 1998, pp. 139-44). 
 28 
higher ranks (Kanter, 1977). In that case, women might be less cooperative with one another than 
with men and even engage in sabotage (Lazear, 1999), which could lower their relative 
promotion rates. This form of gender discrimination in promotions, through which female 
workers are competing most intensively with their female peers to be promoted into positions 
occupied by female bosses, would imply negative gender spillovers within ranks but positive 
spillovers from higher-ranking to lower-ranking women. Without this type of competition, there 
is no reason to expect a mechanical relationship between female shares at the current or higher 
rank and the likelihood that any individual woman is promoted. Another reason for negative 
spillovers from same-sex peers could be that more within-gender group socializing leads to more 
shirking from work; in contrast with the previous mechanism, this would imply positive (or zero) 
gender spillovers across ranks. 
4.1 Empirical Approach and Identification 
Motivated by the theoretical ambiguity of these effects, we measure gender spillovers on 
promotion rates by adding variables and interaction terms to our empirical model as follows: 
(4) Promotionijt =  βFFemalei + βXXijt + βPFemaleSharePeersijt +  
βPFFemaleSharePeersijt*Femalei + βPFemaleShareBossesijt +  
βPFFemaleShareBossesijt*Femalei + εijt 
where the variable FemaleSharePeers is the female share of worker i’s peers at the same rank, 
establishment j, and year t. FemaleShareBosses denotes the female share of worker i’s bosses 
who are one rank higher than worker i at the same establishment j in year t. Each of these 
variables is interacted with the Female dummy variable to create the differential effects of 
interest. Because the measures of female shares among peers and bosses are correlated with one 
another, it is important to include them together in the regression models. Note that the outcome 
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variable is the change in rank between period t and (t+1) and the explanatory variables are all 
measured in period t, before the promotion occurs.  
 Adding these spillover variables to the model potentially introduces new identification 
challenges related to the estimation of social interactions or peer effects (e.g., Manski, 1993). 
These variables are direct measures of “contextual effects” (related to peer characteristics rather 
than the “endogenous effects” of peer behavior). It is important to be clear that their estimated 
effects will incorporate both the direct effect of the characteristics as well as any effects that are 
caused by the behavior of these peers that is related to their gender. In that sense, we are not 
aiming to isolate the purely contextual effects in our estimates.  
The two other identification challenges related to estimating spillover effects derive from 
the possibility of common shocks (unobservable to researchers) affecting all coworkers and 
endogenous group formation.28 It is not obvious what direction we should expect these biases to 
have. For the estimated effects of peers at the same rank, we might expect positive bias in the 
FemaleSharePeers*Female interaction if women are drawn to establishments where they face 
higher chances of promotion; those workplaces would have higher shares of female peers and 
higher promotion rates for women. By contrast, if female bosses attract more female workers at 
lower levels, that would not bias the estimated effects of female bosses on promotion rates unless 
the female bosses were able to attract higher quality (along unmeasured dimensions) female 
candidates. In that case, there would be a positive correlation between female bosses and female 
promotion rates that is based in part on “selection” into the workplace rather than events after the 
worker joins the establishment. This type of selection could still be interpreted as a form of 
                                                
28 Because we are not including endogenous peer effects (promotions and retention) as covariates in our 
model, our estimates will not suffer from the “reflection problem”; only common shocks and systematic 
worker sorting that are correlated with the peer demographics and other controls will introduce bias. 
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gender spillover, but it would differ from the channels related to human capital investments, 
productivity or discrimination.   
In the next section, we can address the major concerns about omitted variable biases, 
potentially related to non-random sorting of workers to workplaces, by including different sets of 
control variables and fixed effects in our regression models. Our main models in Section 4.2 
include a full set of establishment, rank and year fixed effects and Section 4.3 shows the 
robustness of the estimates to including additional controls and interaction terms. 29  
4.2 Main Results for Gender Spillovers 
Our main estimates of gender spillovers using Equation 4 are reported in Table 5. As in Table 3, 
the top panel presents results for any promotions, the middle panel is for internal promotions, 
and the bottom panel is for staying at the same plant. The first three columns of Table 5 include 
the same sets of controls and fixed effects as Columns 2 to 4 of Table 3. Column1 of Table 5 has 
controls for year, industry, occupation, rank, age, schooling, experience, tenure, rank specific 
tenure and part-time status; Column 2 adds plant fixed effects; and Column 3 adds the two 
indicators for having children (under the ages of 17 and 7) and their interactions with the Female 
indicator. Column 4 addresses the concern that within-establishment variation across ranks may 
be related to both female shares and promotion rates by adding a full set of establishment-by-
rank fixed effects.  
Across all of these models, We find significant gender spillovers from peers and bosses 
that act in opposite directions. Having more female workers in the next highest rank tends to 
                                                
29 Given our empirical setting, we are clearly not able to exploit experimental variation in female 
representation for identification. An approach that is sometimes used in the peer effects literature to 
generate quasi-random variation in peer groups using observational data is to focus on individuals who 
stay in a group, but whose peer characteristics are changed by others who enter or leave the group. 
Unfortunately, given the endogenous nature of the decisions to leave a workplace and which new 
workplace to enter, this strategy is not appealing in our setting.  
 31 
reduce the gender gap in promotion rates by raising women’s relative promotion chances, but 
having more female coworkers in the same rank tends to increase it. The coefficient on the 
Female*FemalePeerShare interaction ranges from −0.060 to −0.062, and is substantially larger 
than the Female*FemaleBossShare interaction of 0.018 to 0.020.  
The fact that adding plant fixed effects has only minor effects on the estimates provides 
empirical evidence against non-random selection into workplaces being an important source of 
bias for our estimated spillover effects.30 The coefficient of 0.019 from our main specification in 
Column 2 implies that a standard deviation increase in the female boss share (an increase of 
0.24) would decrease the gender gap in promotions by 13.8 percent (from a base of 0.033; see 
Table 8). The model in Column 2 also implies that increasing the female share among peers by a 
standard deviation (or 0.29) would increase the gender gap in promotions by 52.7 percent. These 
patterns are repeated in the middle panel of the table for internal promotions.  
The positive interaction effect from female bosses is consistent with women helping 
women below them in the hierarchy through mentoring or taste-based discrimination by 
supervisors. The finding provides further support for the theory that demand-side factors play a 
role in creating the observed gender gaps in promotion rates. It suggests that one reason for 
women’s slow progress to the top of corporate hierarchies is the historical male domination of 
those ranks. In that sense, it provides empirical support for the presence of a key mechanism 
underlying public policies aimed at promoting women in business leadership positions – that 
female leaders tend to help lower-ranking women in their organizations.  
However, the finding of negative gender interactions among women at the same rank 
complicates this story of women helping women. Because many of the theories of positive 
gender spillovers (mentoring, sponsorship, role models, access to powerful networks) are more 
                                                
30 We report estimates from models with additional sets of fixed effects in the next subsection.  
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important for bosses than for peers, the absence of positive spillovers may not be surprising. As 
discussed above, the negative effects of female peers may come from greater competition (and 
less cooperation) among peers of the same sex (which would also generate the positive effect on 
male peers) or from women in lower ranks facing greater competition for scarce sex-specific 
resources such as mentors and sponsors. Interestingly, Karaca-Mandic et al. (2013) also find 
negative gender spillovers among peers in the lower ranks of the US Army.  
Although female bosses are associated with higher promotion rates for female workers, 
they appear to have no significant effects on promotion rates for males. This gender difference 
provides further evidence against the presence of an omitted variable that is related to promotion 
rates overall (such as corporate growth and expansion) and to female boss shares (for example, if 
growing firms are able to increase diversity at higher ranks more rapidly). Unlike the zero effect 
of female bosses on male promotion rates, female peers are estimated to have a positive effect on 
male promotion rates. These positive effects for men also suggest that the negative peer effects 
on women are not driven by an omitted variable that is related to the female share in a rank and 
overall lower promotion opportunities, which would be the case if women tended to sort into 
“dead-end” job groups identifiable by their work establishment and hierarchical rank 
combination. Furthermore, the fact that we find opposite effects of female peers and bosses also 
rules out stories of sorting or workplace-specific gender-related omitted variables (such as 
female-friendliness) that create spurious correlations between female representation at all levels, 
including bosses and peers, and promotion outcomes for women.  
The middle panel of Table 5 shows similar coefficient estimates for the gender spillovers 
on internal promotions, which implies a proportionally larger effect relative to the overall gender 
gap. This is plausible because the spillovers we study are internal to the firm.  
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The results in the bottom panel of Table 5 show no significant gender spillovers in the 
probability of staying at the same workplace, after plant fixed effects are included in the model 
(Columns 2 and 3). The significant spillover coefficients in Column 1 seem to suggest that there 
is some sorting out of workplaces based on gender compositions of peers and bosses. However, 
their dramatic reduction in size and significance in the latter two columns indicates that this 
sorting is captured with establishment fixed effects. As discussed above, these same fixed effects 
leave the spillover effects on promotions unchanged.  
Finally, in an unreported regression model, we explored the interactions between plant 
mobility and gender spillovers in promotion rates. Using the main promotion outcome, we added 
a control variable to capture changing plants during the time period and interactions between this 
variable and the Female, FemaleBossShare, FemalePeerShare, Female*FemaleBossShare, and 
Female*FemalePeerShare variables. The last two interaction terms show that the positive gender 
spillovers from female bosses are indistinguishable between workers who stay at the same plant 
and those who change plants (the point estimates is 0.002, with a standard error of 0.007, relative 
to a boss spillover of 0.018, standard error of 0.006), but the negative gender spillovers from 
female peers are about 50% larger for workers who change plants (the point estimate on the 
interaction is −0.023, with a standard error of 0.008, relative to a peer spillover of −0.053, 
standard error of 0.006, for those who stay at the same plant). This suggests that, while female 
peers do not affect the relative mobility rates of male and female workers, they may affect the 
reasons or circumstances associated with changing plants. 
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4.3 Robustness Checks for Gender Spillover Results 
This subsection examines the robustness of the main gender spillover results for the main 
promotion outcome.31 We expand the main model in Column 2 of Table 5 with plant fixed 
effects but without the fertility controls in order to explore the potential role of selection into 
workplaces and omitted variables on the main spillover effects from bosses and peers.  
The first column in Table 6 addresses the concern that female dominated ranks may differ 
in size from male dominated ranks and that these size differences may affect promotion rates. 
Although promotions are not zero-sum in the sense that only one person can advance up from a 
particular rank at each establishment in a given year, there may be restrictions on the number of 
available slots at the higher ranks. When those limits are more binding, competition among peers 
may be more intense. We are not able to observe the number of candidates eligible for promotion 
or the number of available slots, but we proxy for each using the size of the current rank (at the 
establishment and year) and the next highest rank (at the same establishment and year). Adding 
these controls leaves the main results unchanged: it reduces the estimated gender spillover from 
bosses by 0.003 to 0.016 and the estimated gender spillover from peers by 0.004 to −0.056.  
Column 2 adds a full set of interactions between the Female and rank indicators. This is 
to address the concern that differences in the female shares of peers and bosses may be related to 
workers’ ranks, which would mean that the estimated interactions between the coworker 
variables and the Female indicator reflect in part the cross-rank differences in gender gaps in 
promotion found in Table 4.  
We next consider in Column 3 the possibility that our results are driven by sorting within 
ranks and establishments that leaves women disproportionately working in occupational groups 
                                                
31 Results for the other outcomes are similarly robust. Our OLS estimates are nearly identical to the 
average marginal effects from corresponding Probit models. The main relationships are also statistically 
significant under alterative clustering schemes (at the establishment-year or establishment level).   
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with limited promotion opportunities at their workplaces. We assess the importance of this 
explanation by adding a control to our model for the share of workers in the next higher rank in 
the organization from the worker’s current occupational group (recall that these groups span 
multiple ranks). Including this variable does not alter the estimated gender gap in promotion 
rates overall or (as shown in Column 4) the estimated gender spillovers in promotions from peers 
or bosses. Controlling for the female share in the rank below (unreported) also leaves the 
estimates unchanged; the female share in the lower rank does not affect promotion rates for men 
or gender differences in promotion rates.  
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 6 are motivated by concerns about time-varying omitted 
variables that are not addressed by the establishment and rank fixed effects. The first is that 
selection into establishments is based on the current reputation of the establishment (which is 
related to current promotion rates) and that this variable (unobserved by researchers) varies over 
time. The second is that the relationship between ranks and promotion rates is changing over 
time. These time-varying factors can introduce bias in our models because female representation 
in the sample, and in the higher ranks, are both increasing over the period (Appendix Table 3A). 
We address the first point in Column 4 with the inclusion of establishment-by-year fixed effects 
and the second point in Column 5 with rank-by-year fixed effects. Estimates with these 
additional controls confirm the results from Table 5. 
In the last column of Table 6, the regression is extended with a control for the share of 
men under age 46 in the top three ranks at that establishment in that year. The goal of this control 
is to test the alternative hypothesis women are more frequently promoted in workplaces with 
more modern attitudes. Although the establishment (and establishment-by-year) fixed effects 
would address this concern, if present, this test allows us to investigate the relevance of the 
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channel directly. In fact, we find that controlling for the share of young male bosses does not 
affect our main estimate, in models with or without establishment fixed effects.  
The second set of robustness checks, in Table 7, explores how the estimated effect of 
female bosses on the gender gap in promotions varies under three alternative measures of the 
female boss share. In Columns 1 and 2, we use a measure based on the female share of workers 
two ranks higher than the worker’s current rank. This incorporates the possibility that individuals 
in the higher rank are involved in deciding on promotions to the rank below them. This type of 
gender spillover, if present, also has the appealing feature of potentially generating a cascade of 
effects down the hierarchy. Such effects are not implied if gender spillovers are limited to effects 
from the immediate rank above onto promotions into that rank. These spillovers appear to be 
positive and substantial in our data (larger than the estimates from our primary measure) and 
they are present even after controlling for our primary measure (Column 2).  
Column 3 uses an establishment-wide measure of female leadership based on the female 
share in the top three ranks (averaging about 4 to 5 percent; Appendix Table 3A) and uses a 
sample limited to workers in ranks 1 to 4. Column 4 identifies leaders based on the top earners in 
the establishment and year (using a top 20 percent cutoff). Column 5 defines bosses to include all 
workers whose detailed job descriptions contain leadership tasks. The female boss share is 
lowest under this definition (Appendix Table 3A). Across each of these three alternative 
measures, the estimated effect of female bosses on the promotion rates of women relative to men 
are positive, substantial, and statistically significant. These results confirm the robustness of the 
overall finding of positive gender spillovers from female bosses to female workers and suggest 
that various types of female bosses can each contribute to the career progression of female 
employees. The results in Column 6 also support the appropriateness of measuring female boss 
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shares without regard to occupational group: a measure of the female share of bosses within the 
same occupational group has no additional explanatory power for the gender gap in promotions. 
Table 8 provides some perspective on the magnitude of the estimated effects of female 
coworkers relative to sample variation in those measures and to the overall gender gap in 
promotions in our data. The first row reports the coefficients from our preferred estimation 
models for each measure of female shares, and the second reports the sample standard deviation 
of the female share measure. Finally, the last row reports the predicted effect of a standard 
deviation increase in the female share of peers or bosses (for each of the alternative measures) on 
the gender gap in promotions. The negative gender spillovers from peers are largest, accounting 
for a 52.7 percent increase in the gap. The positive gender spillovers from bosses are smaller, but 
still substantial, with a standard deviation increase in female leadership narrowing the gap by 
11.6 to 21.1 percent for the first four measures and by a more modest 4.1 percent for the final 
and most stringent measure (with the lowest levels of female representation, as shown in 
Appendix Table 3A). This pattern confirms the quantitative importance of female leadership 
within organizations, and not just at the highest levels, to ensure female progress up the ranks.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper uses an 11-year employer-employee matched panel on white-collar workers at over 
4,000 workplaces in Norway to study gender differences in promotion rates across seven 
hierarchical ranks. We find that women are significantly less likely than men to be promoted to a 
higher rank in the organizational hierarchy, conditional on a wide range of individual 
characteristics and workplace, time and rank fixed effects. This gender gap in promotions is 
present whether we include or exclude promotions that involve a change in workplace. It is also 
present across all six of the lower ranks from which workers can be promoted, which indicates 
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that both “sticky floors” and “glass ceilings” are contributing to women’s severe under-
representation at the highest levels of corporate hierarchies.  
 Using unique data on the gender composition of workplaces within hierarchical ranks, we 
next show how the promotion gap is affected by the presence of female bosses and female peers. 
Several theories predict the increasing female leadership can improve outcomes for lower-
ranking women: lower-ranking women may gain access to better mentors and role modeling and 
to powerful professional networks. Consistent with this prediction, we find that higher shares of 
female workers at the next highest rank are associated with significantly smaller gender gaps in 
promotion. This finding is not coming from higher relative promotion rates for women overall at 
firms that hire more women in all ranks (because they are more “female friendly” in general). In 
fact, we find that having a greater share of female coworkers at the same establishment and rank 
actually depresses promotion rates for women, relative to men. This negative effect may be 
caused by greater competition within gender (either between men or women) among peers, either 
for promotions or for gender-specific mentoring and support.  
 The finding that greater female representation at higher ranks narrows the gender gap in 
promotion rates at lower ranks supports the theory that men’s dominance in corporate leadership 
continues to present barriers to women’s advancement in corporate hierarchies. It also suggests 
that policies that promote greater female representation in corporate leadership will have 
spillover benefits to women in lower ranks. There are, however, reasons to believe that our 
estimates may understate the true importance of gender spillovers from female leaders to other 
female workers. Specifically, because our empirical setup is focused on measuring spillovers 
within organizations, our estimates will fail to capture any spillover benefits from female leaders 
to women in other firms or establishments. These can be important if mentoring occurs across 
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these boundaries (possibly through professional or social groups outside of the workplace) or one 
of the ways in which women help other women progress in their careers is by hiring them 
through external recruitment from other organizations. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Male Female Total Total Total
Mean Mean Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
Rank = 1 (low) 0.024 0.27 0.094 744,531
Rank = 2 0.18 0.15 0.17 744,531
Rank = 3 0.28 0.4 0.31 744,531
Rank = 4 0.29 0.14 0.25 744,531
Rank = 5 0.079 0.012 0.06 744,531
Rank = 6 0.13 0.025 0.1 744,531
Rank = 7 (top) 0.015 0.0011 0.011 744,531
Female 0 1 0.3 597,552
Promotion 0.073 0.066 0.071 597,552
Internal Promotion 0.059 0.056 0.058 597,552
Stay at Plant 0.74 0.74 0.74 597,552
Stay at Rank 0.87 0.87 0.87 597,552
Age 40.2 37.1 39.3 9.04 597,552
Years Schooling 12.6 11.7 12.3 2.62 597,552
Years Work Experience 18.4 14.5 17.3 7.33 597,552
Years Tenure 7.41 6.52 7.15 5.28 597,552
Rank Specific Tenure 4.29 4.04 4.22 2.76 597,552
Working Part-Time 0.076 0.26 0.13 597,552
Any Children 0.7 0.56 0.66 597,552
Children under 7 0.33 0.27 0.31 597,552
Hourly Wage (NOK) 127.7 96.6 118.9 597,552
Female Boss Share 0.14 0.25 0.17 0.24 597,552
Female Peer Share 0.18 0.58 0.3 0.29 597,552
High Wage for Rank 0.27 0.13 0.23 597,552
Entire Sample
Main analysis sample
Notes: Data from NHO (1987-1997) and Statistics Norway. Summary statistics are reported for the 
entire sample and the main analysis sample that includes workers in ranks 1 to 6 and for whom we 
calculated the proportion of female bosses at the next highest rank. The proportions of workers within 
each of the ranks (1 through 7) and average hourly wage are reported using the entire sample. Hourly 
wages are the ratio of earnings (measured in real Norwegian Kroner, NOK) and hours worked. Female 
boss share is defined for workers 1 rank higher. High wage for rank is whether a worker earns a high 
wage (in the top 30 percent) for one's rank.
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Table 2. Promotion, Mobility and Wages by Rank and Sex
All Male Female
Rank Mean Mean Mean
Promotion 1 0.13 0.18 0.11
2 0.084 0.091 0.063
3 0.064 0.077 0.041
4 0.054 0.057 0.039
5 0.069 0.069 0.072
6 0.017 0.017 0.01
7 0 0 0
Total 0.066 0.067 0.063
Internal Promotion 1 0.11 0.15 0.098
2 0.068 0.073 0.052
3 0.052 0.062 0.035
4 0.043 0.045 0.032
5 0.057 0.056 0.061
6 0.013 0.013 0.0077
7 0 0 0
Total 0.053 0.053 0.054
Stay at Plant 1 0.73 0.75 0.72
2 0.69 0.7 0.67
3 0.74 0.74 0.74
4 0.73 0.73 0.72
5 0.74 0.75 0.72
6 0.72 0.73 0.69
7 0.66 0.66 0.5
Total 0.73 0.73 0.72
Hourly Wage 1 82.6 89.5 81
2 98.3 100.9 90.4
3 102.4 106.9 94.5
4 129.9 131.7 120.7
5 163.6 163.7 161.2
6 173.5 174.4 162.1
7 221.7 221.9 214.7
Total 118.9 127.7 96.6
Notes: Data from NHO (1987-1997) and Statistics Norway. Sample includes all workers in all 
ranks (744,531 observations). Hourly wages are the ratio of earnings (measured in real 
Norwegian Kroner, NOK) and hours worked. 
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Table 3. Gender Differences in Promotions and Mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.035*** -0.029*** -0.033*** -0.025***
[0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0013] [0.0015]
N 597,552 597,552 597,552 597,552
R2 0.046 0.049 0.072 0.072
Female -0.028*** -0.022*** -0.026*** -0.020***
[0.0011] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0014]
N 597,552 597,552 597,552 597,552
R2 0.038 0.04 0.061 0.061
Female 0.0020 0.00013 0.0020 0.0030
[0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0017] [0.0020]
N 597,552 597,552 597,552 597,552
R2 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.44
Basic Controls
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects for Industry and Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects for Age, Schooling Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic Controls for Experience and Tenure, 
Linear Rank-Specific Tenure, Indicator for Part-
Time Status No Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls
Plant Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Children Fixed Effects No No No Yes
     
Notes: OLS estimates with standard errors clustered at the plant-rank-year level. Part-time status is <37 hours 
per week. Children effects are indicators for any children under age 17, any children under age 7, and 
interactions of each with the Female indicator. Controls are defined in period t for promotion and mobility 
outcomes between periods t and t+1. Occupation groups are listed in Appendix Table 8A.
     *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
       ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
         * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Promotion
Internal Promotion
Stay at Plant
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Table 4. Gender Differences in Promotions and Mobility by Rank
(1) (2) (3)
Promotion Internal Promotion Stay at Plant
Female and Rank = 1 -0.048*** -0.038*** 0.0045
[0.0071] [0.0064] [0.010]
Female and Rank = 2 -0.016*** -0.012*** 0.00038
[0.0026] [0.0024] [0.0038]
Female and Rank = 3 -0.044*** -0.035*** 0.0012
[0.0018] [0.0017] [0.0025]
Female and Rank = 4 -0.024*** -0.019*** 0.0014
[0.0024] [0.0022] [0.0035]
Female and Rank = 5 -0.020*** -0.015** 0.0086
[0.0065] [0.0062] [0.0081]
Female and Rank = 6 -0.0086*** -0.0061** 0.013*
[0.0028] [0.0024] [0.0066]
N 597,552 597,552 597,552
R2 0.072 0.061 0.44
Notes: Estimates from OLS models with standard errors clustered at the plant-rank-year 
level. Outcome variables are measured as changes between periods t and t+1. Controls as in 
Table 3, Column (3), are measured in period t.
     *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
       ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
         * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5. Gender Spillovers in Promotions and Mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female * Female Boss Share 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.018***  0.015*** 
[0.0044] [0.0047] [0.0047]   [0.004]  
Female * Female Peer Share -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.062***  -0.067***
[0.0054] [0.0057] [0.0057]   [0.006]  
Female Boss Share 0.0048 -0.0058 -0.0054  -0.013***
[0.0037] [0.0049] [0.0049]   [0.005]  
Female Peer Share 0.050*** 0.036*** 0.037*** -0.011
[0.0048] [0.0059] [0.0059]   [0.007]  
N 597,552 597,552 597,552 597,552
R2 0.05 0.073 0.073 0.088
Female * Female Boss Share 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.019***  0.016***
[0.0040] [0.0043] [0.0043] [0.0043] 
Female * Female Peer Share -0.055*** -0.052*** -0.053***  -0.060***
[0.0051] [0.0053] [0.0053] [0.0058] 
Female Boss Share 0.0019 -0.0068 -0.0065  -0.016***
[0.0033] [0.0044] [0.0044] [0.0052] 
Female Peer Share 0.045*** 0.031*** 0.031*** -0.012
[0.0045] [0.0056] [0.0056] [0.0070] 
N 597,552 597,552 597,552 597,552
R2 0.041 0.061 0.061 0.75
Female * Female Boss Share 0.015* 0.0044 0.0046 -0.001
[0.0080] [0.0068] [0.0068] [0.0064]
Female * Female Peer Share -0.045*** 0.012 0.013 0.020
[0.010] [0.0086] [0.0086] [ 0.0072]
Female Boss Share -0.016** 0.0016 0.0017 0.003
[0.0082] [0.0080] [0.0080] [ 0.0101]
Female Peer Share 0.031*** -0.0032 -0.0038 0.009
[0.0093] [0.0098] [0.0098] [0.0122]
N 597,552 597,552 597,552 597,552
R2 0.32 0.44 0.44 0.43
Basic Controls including Rank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant FE No Yes Yes Yes
Children FE No No Yes Yes
Rank-Plant FE No No No Yes
Notes: OLS estimates with standard errors clustered at the plant-rank-year level Female Boss Share is the 
female share of workers in the next highest rank at the same plant-year. Peer share is for workers at the 
same rank in the same plant-year. Outcome variables are measured as changes from period t to t+1. Basic 
controls in all columns are as in Table 3, Column (2), and measured in period t. *** Significant at the 1 
percent level.  ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Promotion
Internal Promotion
Stay at Plant
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Table 6. Robustness Checks for Gender Spillovers in Promotions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female * Female Boss Share 0.016*** 0.010** 0.025** 0.020*** 0.020*** .018***
[0.0047] [0.0053] [0.0102] [0.0045] [0.0046] [ .0046]
Female * Female Peer Share -0.056*** -0.048*** -0.079*** -0.068*** -0.060***  -.060***
[0.0057] [0.0065] [0.0094] [0.0055] [0.0057] [.0056]
Female Boss Share -0.0056 -0.0026 -0.0103 0.00094 -0.0054 -.004
[0.0048] [0.0049] [0.0109] [0.0048] [0.0048] [ .0048]
Female Peer Share 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.047*** 0.055*** 0.038*** .036***
[0.0058] [0.0063] [0.0106] [0.0058] [0.0059] [ .0059]
Size of Ranks (Own and Next Higher) Yes No No No No No
Rank-Sex FE No Yes No No No No
Occupation Group Share in Next Rank No No Yes No No No
Plant-Year FE No No No Yes No No
Rank-Year FE No No No No Yes No
Share of Men under Age 46 in Ranks 5  
to 7 and Interaction with Female No No No No No Yes
N 597,463 597,552 318,760 597,552 597,552 596,552
R2 0.074 0.073 0.075 0.15 0.075 0.073
     *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
       ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
         * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Promotion
Notes: OLS estimates with standard errors clustered at the plant-rank-year level. Basic controls in all columns are as in Table 5, 
Column (2).
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Table 7. Gender Spillovers in Promotions with Alternative Definitions of Female Boss Share 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female * Female Boss (+2) Share 0.041*** 0.033***
[0.0079] [0.0082]
Female * Female Boss (+1) Share 0.021*** .024***
[0.0064] [0.1021]
Female * Female Boss (Top 3) Share 0.051***
[0.010]
Female * Female Boss (Top Earners) Share 0.069***
[0.0071]
Female * Female Boss (Leaders) Share 0.021**
[0.010]
Female * Female Boss Share Same Occupation -.005
[0.005]
Female * Female Peer Share -0.073*** -0.076*** -0.061*** -0.064*** -0.085*** -.071
[0.0071] [0.0073] [0.0064] [0.0057] [0.0085] [0.009]
N 453,924 453,924 471,561 583,859 325,320 318760
R2 0.078 0.078 0.074 0.07 0.07 0.073
     *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
       ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
         * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Promotion
Notes: OLS estimates with standard errors clustered at the plant-rank-year level. Controls are as in Column (3) of Table 3. Female Boss 
(+2) is the share 2 ranks higher; Female Boss (Top 3) is the share in ranks 5-7; Top earners are in the top fifth for their establishment-
year;  Female Boss (Leader) applies to higher ranks with leadership tasks. Female Boss Share Same Occupation refers to the proportion 
of females one rank higher who are in the same occupation group. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Peers Bosses Bosses Bosses Bosses Bosses
Same Rank Rank + 1 Rank + 2 Rank 5-7 Top Earners Leaders
Estimated coefficient for female share -0.060 0.019 0.041 0.051 0.069 0.021
Standard deviation across individuals 0.290 0.240 0.170 0.075 0.090 0.064
Predicted change in the gender promotion 
gap from a standard deviation increase in 
female representation 52.7% -13.8% -21.1% -11.6% -18.8% -4.1%
Table 8: Predicted Effects of Increasing Female Peer and Boss Shares on Women's Relative Promotion Rates 
Female share measure:  
Notes: The coefficient estimates for the female share in Columns 1 and 2 are from Table 5, Column 2. The remaing coefficients are 
from Table 7. Column 3 here is from Column 1; Column 4 is from Column 3; Column 5 is from Column 4 and Column 6 is from 
Column 5.
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Figure 1: Sex Differences by Rank. The lines for internal promotion, promotion, stay at plant, and 
wage each plot the female to male ratio of the mean values of the outcome within each rank. The line 
for female share in rank plots the female share of workers in that rank. The female share of the entire 
sample is 28 percent.
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Figure 2: Gender Pay Gap Estimates with and without Rank Fixed Effects. Each bar is a point 
estimate for the Female coefficient from an OLS regression of the log of wage rate (computed by 
dividing average monthly earnings by normal hours) on Female without (dark bars) and with (light 
bars) rank fixed effects. The first pair of lines has no additional controls. The second pair includes fixed 
effects for industry, occupation, year, age and schooling. The third pair also includes controls for tenure 
(overall and rank-specific), experience and part-time status. The last pair has plant fixed effects. All 
reported coefficients are sigificant at the 1 percent level. 
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Industry Group
Sample of 
plants where we 
observe at least 
one MALE 
white-collar 
employee and 
the plant is 
member of the 
NHO
Population of 
plants in 
Norway with at 
least one MALE 
employee
Sample of 
plants where we 
observe at least 
one FEMALE 
white-collar 
employee and 
the plant is 
member of the 
NHO
Population of 
plants in 
Norway with at 
least one 
FEMALE 
employee
Agriculture 0.59 2.06 0.32 1.05
Mining, oil extraction 4.11 1.71 1.94 0.55
Manufacturing 39.60 23.35 18.41 8.63
Energy 1.39 1.58 0.51 0.41
Construction 8.85 10.71 1.48 1.33
Wholesale, retail, hotels 8.49 16.65 9.77 19.72
Transport, communications 8.34 10.28 4.97 4.82
Finance, insurance, real estate 7.28 9.30 8.71 7.94
Public administration, service 21.35 24.36 53.90 55.56
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total number of employees 350,999 (37%) 958,583 234,011 (27%) 873,189
Percentage white collar workers 21 15
analysis we use only white-collar workers. 21 percent of men in Column 1 and and 15 percent of women 
in Column 3 are white collar workers in our final sample for 1997.
Source: NHO 1997 and Statistics Norway 1997.
Notes: The table reports the employment percentages for all workers in these sectors. In the empirical
Appendix Table 1A. Employment Percentages by Industry Group and Sex in the Sample of Plants 
with White Collar Workers and the Population of Plants in Norway, 1997
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Appendix Table 2A. Description of Hierarchical Ranks
Rank Sample Job Titles and Codes in Rank
7 (Top) Technical director (A0)
Assistant director, Director of a major department (C0)
6 Chief engineer, Plant manager, Production manager, Chief researcher (A1)
Chief work leader (e.g., Plant leader, Production leader) (B1)
Head of department (C1)
5 Chief of a specific department (construction, laboratory, etc.) (A2)
4 Administrator, Engineer, etc. (A31/A32)
Foreman (B2)
Accountant, Shipper (C2)
3 Craftsman (A41/A42)
Foreman, Shift foreman, Controller (B3)
Skilled clerk, Accounting clerk, Logistics manager (C3)
Shop manager (D1)
Store manager (E1)
2 Technician (A5)
Shop cashier, Sales assistant (D2)
Storeman, Bookkeeper (E2)
Various (F)
1 (Bottom) Unskilled (technical) (A6)
Unskilled (clerical) (C4)
Notes: The table reports examples of job titles for each rank from top (7) to bottom (1). To create this 
hierarchy we exploit the information that was collected by NHO from the employers through the 
questionnaire. The data contain job descriptions for 20 occupational jobs. The 20 occupational jobs are 
distinguished into 6 occupational groups that are: A technical, B production supervision, C administrative, 
including clerical, accounting, and shipping, D sales, E storage and F other. Each of the jobs in each 
occupational group is also associated with a task level from 0 to 6. The number of levels varies across 
occupational groups and are pre-defined by NHO. Occupation group A has 7 task levels and we combined 2 
that are very similar. Occupation group B has 3, C has 5, D has 2, E has 2 and F has a single task level.  The 
job descriptions specify the human capital and tasks of the job. For example, the higher the job is in the 
hierarchy the greater the human capital and leadership skills requirement. The questionnaire provided to 
employers by the NHO include details on the occupational groups, task levels and job descriptions. 
Employers complete the survey by sorting every white-collar worker at their establishment into a grid with 
this information. 
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Appendix Table 3A. Summary of Plant-Year Measures of Female Representation 
All Ranks Top 3 Ranks Top Earners Leaders Observations
1987 0.251 0.041 0.038 0.009 3640
1988 0.278 0.052 0.045 0.007 4491
1989 0.265 0.050 0.047 0.016 4421
1990 0.253 0.056 0.054 0.019 4320
1991 0.334 0.049 0.079 0.025 4535
1992 0.332 0.050 0.077 0.033 4718
1993 0.332 0.054 0.087 0.036 4613
1994 0.333 0.048 0.088 0.033 4877
1995 0.328 0.050 0.089 0.034 5389
1996 0.326 0.054 0.095 0.040 5479
1997 0.334 0.057 0.101 0.036 5610
Share Female by Plant-Year
Notes: Unweighted averages across establishments. The first column covers all ranks and the next 3 
columns are for alternative measures of bosses: Top 3 Ranks is limited to ranks 5-7, Top Earners are in the 
top 20 percent of earners for the plant-year, and Leaders have leadership job functions.
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Table 4A. Age and Years of Education by Rank and Sex
All Male Female
Rank Mean Mean Mean
Age 1 37 37 36
2 39 39 38
3 39 40 38
4 40 40 37
5 42 43 37
6 43 43 40
7 45 45 41
Total 40 41 37
Years of education 1 11 11 11
2 11 11 11
3 12 12 12
4 13 13 13
5 15 15 16
6 14 14 14
7 15 15 15
Total 12 13 12
Notes: Data from NHO (1987-1997) and Statistics Norway. Sample includes all workers in all 
ranks (744,531 observations). Hourly wages are the ratio of earnings (measured in real 
Norwegian Kroner, NOK) and hours worked. 
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Appendix Table 5A. Gender Differences in Promotion Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female -0.035*** -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.023***
[0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0012]
Rank = 2 -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.017***
[0.0048] [0.0048] [0.0050] [0.0050] [0.0050] [0.0050] [0.0049]
Rank = 3 -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.087*** -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.084***
[0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0033] [0.0034] [0.0034] [0.0034] [0.0033]
Rank = 4 -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.13***
[0.0036] [0.0036] [0.0038] [0.0039] [0.0039] [0.0039] [0.0038]
Rank = 5 -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.13***
[0.0054] [0.0056] [0.0056] [0.0056] [0.0056] [0.0056] [0.0056]
Rank = 6 -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.19***
[0.0044] [0.0045] [0.0050] [0.0051] [0.0051] [0.0051] [0.0049]
Years Experience -0.0046*** -0.0048*** -0.0049*** -0.0049*** -0.0048*** -0.0065***
[0.00053] [0.00053] [0.00053] [0.00053] [0.00053] [0.00053]
Years Experience ^2 0.00015*** 0.00015*** 0.00015*** 0.00015*** 0.00015*** 0.00018***
[0.000013] [0.000013] [0.000013] [0.000013] [0.000014] [0.000013]
Years Tenure -0.0013*** -0.00048 -0.00050 -0.00056* -0.00055* -0.00065**
[0.00033] [0.00033] [0.00033] [0.00033] [0.00033] [0.00033]
Years Tenure Squared 0.000060***0.000045*** 0.000050*** 0.000052*** 0.000051*** 0.000047***
[0.000015] [0.000016] [0.000015] [0.000015] [0.000015] [0.000015]
Rank Specific Tenure -0.0042*** -0.0042*** -0.0040*** -0.0040*** -0.0040*** -0.0034***
[0.00023] [0.00023] [0.00023] [0.00023] [0.00023] [0.00023]
Working Part-Time -0.024*** -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.037***
[0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016]
High Wage for Rank 0.074***
[0.0016]
Children under 17 0.0098*** 0.0098***
[0.0011] [0.0011]
Children under 7 -0.0010 0.0012
[0.0011] [0.0016]
-0.0083*** -0.0083***
[0.0019] [0.0019]
-0.0088*** -0.018***
[0.0020] [0.0030]
-0.0045**
[0.0021]
0.016***
[0.0036]
Firm FE No No Yes No No No No
Plant FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 597,552 597,552 597,552 597,552 597,552 597,552 597,552
R2 0.046 0.049 0.067 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.085
Female * Children under 7
Children under 7 Post-1992
Female * Under 7 * Post-1992
Female * Children under 17
Estimates from OLS models with standard errors clustered at the plant-rank-year level except the last column which 
uses the plant-year level. Part-time status is <37 hours per week. All models include industry, occupation, year, age, and 
schooling fixed effects. Controls are defined in period t for promotion outcomes between periods t and t+1.
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Appendix Table 6A. Gender Differences in Internal Promotion Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female -0.028*** -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.017***
[0.0011] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0012]
Rank = 2 -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.017***
[0.0045] [0.0045] [0.0047] [0.0047] [0.0047] [0.0047] [0.0046]
Rank = 3 -0.073*** -0.072*** -0.077*** -0.078*** -0.078*** -0.078*** -0.075***
[0.0030] [0.0030] [0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0032]
Rank = 4 -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.11***
[0.0034] [0.0034] [0.0036] [0.0036] [0.0036] [0.0036] [0.0036]
Rank = 5 -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.11***
[0.0051] [0.0053] [0.0053] [0.0053] [0.0053] [0.0053] [0.0053]
Rank = 6 -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.16***
[0.0042] [0.0042] [0.0047] [0.0048] [0.0048] [0.0048] [0.0046]
Years Experience -0.0032*** -0.0032*** -0.0032*** -0.0032*** -0.0032*** -0.0046***
[0.00048] [0.00048] [0.00048] [0.00048] [0.00048] [0.00048]
Years Experience ^2 0.00011*** 0.00011*** 0.00011*** 0.00011*** 0.00011*** 0.00014***
[0.000012] [0.000012] [0.000012] [0.000012] [0.000012] [0.000012]
Years Tenure -0.00018 -0.00025 -0.00032 -0.00036 -0.00035 -0.00044
[0.00031] [0.00031] [0.00031] [0.00031] [0.00031] [0.00031]
Years Tenure Squared 0.000014 0.000034** 0.000034** 0.000035** 0.000035** 0.000031**
[0.000014] [0.000015] [0.000014] [0.000015] [0.000015] [0.000014]
Rank Specific Tenure -0.0034*** -0.0033*** -0.0032*** -0.0032*** -0.0032*** -0.0027***
[0.00022] [0.00021] [0.00021] [0.00021] [0.00021] [0.00021]
Working Part-Time -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.031***
[0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015]
High Wage for Rank 0.064***
[0.0015]
Children under 17 0.0078*** 0.0079***
[0.00099] [0.00099]
Children under 7 -0.0016 -0.00094
[0.0010] [0.0015]
-0.0064*** -0.0062***
[0.0017] [0.0017]
-0.0056*** -0.011***
[0.0019] [0.0028]
-0.0012
[0.0020]
0.0099***
[0.0034]
Firm FE No No Yes No No No No
Plant FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 597,552 597,552 597,552 597,552 597,552 597,552 597,552
R2 0.038 0.040 0.057 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.072
Female * Children under 17
Estimates from OLS models with standard errors clustered at the plant-rank-year level except the last column which 
uses the plant-year level. Part-time status is <37 hours per week. All models include industry, occupation, year, age, and 
schooling fixed effects. Controls are defined in period t for promotion outcomes between periods t and t+1.
Female * Children under 7
Children under 7 Post-1992
Female * Under 7 * Post-1992
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Appendix Table 7A. Gender Differences in Mobility Rates (Outcome = Stay at Current Plant)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female 0.0020 0.00013 0.0037** 0.0020 0.0030 0.0029 0.0022
[0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0017]
Rank = 2 0.0053 0.0025 0.0062 0.0039 0.0036 0.0035 0.0042
[0.0085] [0.0085] [0.0080] [0.0073] [0.0073] [0.0073] [0.0073]
Rank = 3 0.012** 0.0058 0.013** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012**
[0.0055] [0.0056] [0.0052] [0.0049] [0.0049] [0.0049] [0.0049]
Rank = 4 0.0099 -0.0020 0.0095 0.0096 0.0097 0.0097 0.0099
[0.0071] [0.0072] [0.0064] [0.0062] [0.0062] [0.0062] [0.0062]
Rank = 5 0.0021 -0.014 0.0023 0.0058 0.0064 0.0064 0.0065
[0.0086] [0.0088] [0.0080] [0.0078] [0.0078] [0.0078] [0.0079]
Rank = 6 -0.017** -0.031*** -0.0058 -0.0086 -0.0076 -0.0076 -0.0080
[0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0069] [0.0066] [0.0066] [0.0066] [0.0067]
Years Experience -0.0016** 0.0013* 0.0018*** 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0018***
[0.00080] [0.00069] [0.00068] [0.00068] [0.00068] [0.00068]
Years Experience ^2 0.000037* -0.000026 -0.000031* -0.000031* -0.000031* -0.000030*
[0.000021] [0.000018] [0.000017] [0.000017] [0.000017] [0.000017]
Years Tenure 0.012*** 0.0033*** 0.0021*** 0.0020*** 0.0020*** 0.0021***
[0.00097] [0.00074] [0.00076] [0.00076] [0.00076] [0.00076]
Years Tenure Squared -0.00036*** -0.000044 -0.000035 -0.000033 -0.000033 -0.000035
[0.000043] [0.000036] [0.000035] [0.000035] [0.000035] [0.000035]
Rank Specific Tenure 0.0076*** 0.0057*** 0.0050*** 0.0050*** 0.0050*** 0.0050***
[0.00055] [0.00040] [0.00036] [0.00037] [0.00037] [0.00037]
Working Part-Time 0.019*** 0.0017 -0.00064 0.00048 0.00016 -0.00083
[0.0030] [0.0026] [0.0027] [0.0028] [0.0028] [0.0028]
High Wage for Rank 0.0018
[0.0013]
Children under 17 -0.0058*** -0.0058***
[0.0014] [0.0014]
Children under 7 0.0024 0.0036*
[0.0015] [0.0019]
0.0067*** 0.0068***
[0.0025] [0.0025]
-0.016*** -0.024***
[0.0027] [0.0040]
-0.0024
[0.0026]
0.013***
[0.0049]
Firm FE No No Yes No No No No
Plant FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 597,552 597,552 597,552 597,552 597,552 597,552 597,552
R2 0.32 0.32 0.41 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44
Female * Children under 17
Female * Children under 7
Children under 7 Post-1992
Female * Under 7 * Post-1992
Estimates from OLS models with standard errors clustered at the plant-rank-year level except the last column which 
uses the plant-year level. Part-time status is <37 hours per week. All models include industry, occupation, year, age, and 
schooling fixed effects. Controls are defined in period t for mobility outcomes between periods t and t+1.
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Table 8A: Occupation Groups and Promotion Probabilities
Men Women Men Women
A Technical 49 17 58 26
B Production 13 1 6 0.5
C Adminstration 21 70 19 65
D Sales 1 2 1 0.5
E Storage 5 1 3 0.5
F Other 11 9 12 8
Total 100 100 100 100
Notes: Number of observations is 597,552. Numbers are rounded.
Size of Occupational Group Promotions from Occupational 
Group(Percent of Observations) (Percent of Promotions)
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